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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 7813 
DON JESSE NEAL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Don Jesse Neal, the defendant and appellant herein, was 
found guilty by a jury of the crime of murder in the first 
degree. The verdict was without recommendation and the 
judgment and sentence of the court entered thereon was that 
he be shot to death. He now appeals that conviction. The 
factual narrative in appellant's brief is substantially accurate 
and complete and while in certain instances the evidence has 
been presented in a light most favorable to the defendant, it 
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is felt that no useful purpose would be served by making 
an independent recitation of the facts at this time. However, 
where deemed necessary, certain essential evidentiary facts 
have been set forth in detail in the argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT OF THE 
CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WAS LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY AND SUS-
TAINS THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDG-
MENT OF THE COURT. 
II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING IN 
EVIDENCE THE INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE 
BY THE DEFENDANT AFTER THE HOMICIDE. 
III. THE CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE DEFEND-
ANT BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY WAS NOT PREJU-
, DICIAL. 
IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING SEN-
TENCE ON DEFENDANT IN ABSENCE OF DEFEND-
ANT'S COUNSEL. 
V. IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO DENY A MOTION FOR THE EXAMINATION OF 
DESIGNATED PHYSICAL EVIDENCE NOR A lviOTION 
FOR A REHEARING OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
VI. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING 
OFFICER CLARK OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
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DEMONSTRATE THE MOVABILITY OF HIS HANDS 
WHICH WERE HANDCUFFED BEHIND HIS BACK. 




EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT OF THE 
CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WAS LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY AND SUSTAINS 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE COURT. 
In prosecuting this appeal appellant in Point I and in 
portions of Points VI and IX challenges the legal sufficiency 
of the evidence upon which his conviction was based. Such a 
challenge was first made when a motion to dismiss the Infor-
mation was interposed and denied. The motion was founded 
solely upon the claim that the State had failed to prove its case 
because purportedly there was no evidence that the killing 
was· the willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated de-
sign of the defendant. The rule applicable however when a 
motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the evi-
dence was laid down by this Court in State v. Thatcher, 108 
Utah 63, 157 P2d 258 as follows: 
The rule which must be applied upon a motion to 
dismiss a criminal case is that all reasonable inferences 
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are to be taken in favor of the state, and only if the 
record itself reveals that no reasonable man could draw 
an inference of guilt therefrom is the trial court justi-
fied in taking the case from the jury. 
In applying the foregoing rule in this case the trial court could 
properly have done only what it did do in denying the motion 
to dismiss. 
A challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence was 
again made when an exception was taken to the giving of In-
struction 11 in which the court defined the crime of murder 
in the first degree. The exception was taken for no other 
reason than that again purportedly there was no evidence to 
warrant any instruction defining that degree of murder. By 
inference and innuendo it was argued then as now, first that 
the defendant did not do the shooting and second that even 
if he did it occurred during a scuffle and so could not have been 
the result of a deliberate and premeditated design to kill and 
hence not murder in the first degree. Assuming, arguendo, that 
a scuffle did precede the shooting, it does not follow, as is 
argued by appellant, that the resulting killing could not be 
the result of a deliberate and premeditated design to kill and 
hence not murder in the first degree. There is no authority 
to support such a theory. Whether there is or is not a deliberate 
and premeditated design to kill in such a case must be deter-
mined from an analysis of all the surrounding circumstances 
and like all doubtful questions of issuable fact is properly 
a question for the jury. See State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 
145 P2d 1003 and State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 
P2d 153. A careful analysis of all the surrounding circumstances 
in this case leads to the inescapable conclusion that the killing 
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was the wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated act 
of the defendant. 
The uncontradicted evidence shows that immediately prior 
to the shooting the deceased was driving the defendant to the 
police station. While certain witnesses did testify that as the 
car proceeded through the Third South and State Street in-
tersection there appeared to be some kind of a scuffle or a 
locking of shoulders by the defen~nt and the deceased or a 
movement by the defendant closer a-Qd closer to the deceased, 
the record is entirely void of any evidence indicating the 
slightest provocation or justification for the shooting. \Vith 
cool and collected mind the defendant shot the deceased as 
the deceased was driving him to the police station. The sur-
rounding circumstances pointedly reveal that the defendant, 
without provocation, justification or exCll.Se, had the choice to 
shoot or not to shoot. Having made the choice to shoot under 
such circumstances any other conclusion but that the resulting 
killing was the deliberate and premeditated design of the 
defendant would be untenable. 
Finally it is respectfully submitted that appellant appar-
ently is not serious about pressing the assignments of error 
which challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence because 
at page 16 of his brief it is conceded that there is not a lack 
of evidence upon which the verdict of the jury can be sus-
tained. If, as appellant concedes, the evidence does sustain 
the verdict, it was proper to submit the question of first de-
gree murder to the jury in the first instance. Furthermore it 
necessarily follows that the judgment of the court based upon 
that verdict is also sustained by that same evidence. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING IN 
EVIDENCE THE INCRMINATING STATEMENTS MADE 
BY THE DEFENDANT AFTER THE HOMICIDE. 
It is urged that the trial court committed error in admit-
ting in evidence certain incriminating statements made by 
the defendant shortly after the shooting and as he was fleeing 
from the scene. There is ]>( denial that the statements were 
made. The sole contentidh is that they should not have been 
admitted because they were not part of the res gestae. 
While there is nothing in the record to reveal the precise · 
amount of time which transpired from the time of the shoot-
ing until the statements were made it could have been but a 
very few minutes at most. Immediately after the shooting 
the defendant left the DeSoto Sedan in which he ~nd the 
deceased had been riding, ran across the street and boarded a 
bus at the intersection of Third South and State Streets. One 
of the incriminating statements was made as the bus ap-
proached the intersection of Fourth South and State Streets 
which was only one block away and the other was made at 
the A & W Drive Inn located only one additional block south 
near the intersection of Fifth South and State Streets. Under 
the circumstances there can be little doubt concerning the 
spontaneity of the utterances made by the defendant. 
The determination as to what acts or utterances are ad-
missible as part of the res gestae is not one which can be made 
by any arbitrary rule of thumb. As stated in Jones "Commen-
taries on Evidence," Second Edition, Sec. 1204: 
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It is impractical to fix, by general rule, any instant 
of time at which it may be said to be too late for an 
act or declaration to be part of the res gestae and 
so as to preclude debate and conflict of opinion in 
regard to this particular point. So long, however, as 
suspicion of fabrication is absent, and no taint of 
preconceived action or suggestion of design is present, 
the fact that there is a slight interval between the 
declaration and the principal transaction, and that they 
are not entirely synchronous, does not affect its ad-
missiblity as part of the res ·gestae. 
The statements objected to in this else were made as the de-
fendant was fleeing from the scene of the crime and attempting 
to perfect his escape. The circumstances under which they 
were made do not in the slightest degree indicate "suspicion 
of fabrication" or "taint of preconceived action or suggestion 
of design." Rather they show up very definitely as the spon-
taneous uterances of a fleeing felon. To deny their admissibility 
in this case would in effect be an attempt to "exclude every-
thing from the res gestae which did not occur on the very 
instant of the grinding of the flesh and bones" to borrow a 
phrase quoted in Peirce v. VanDusen, 78 Fed. 693, 24 C.C.A. 
280; 69 L.R.A. 705. 
It is respectfully submitted that not only could the in-
criminating statements of the defendant be properly admitted 
in evidence as part of the res gestae but also that they could 
be properly admitted as admissions by the accused. In Warren 
on Homicide, Permanent Edition, Vol. 2, page 651, the rule 
with reference to admissions is set forth as follows: 
A statement by the defendant amounting to an ad-
mission, subsequent to the killing, is admissible to show 
that the defendant committed the crime . 
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In Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Tenth Edition, Sec. 622a, 
page 1266, the rule is stated in the folowing language: 
... admissions are always admissible in evidence 
under an exception to the rule excluding hearsay evi-
dence, provided such admissions are made against in-
terest ... 
See also 20 Am. Jur. 473. 
The incriminating statements made by the defendant 
shortly after the shooting and as he was fleeing from the scene 
of the homicide were properly admitted by the trial court 
either as part of the res gestae or as admissions by the accused. 
POINT III 
THE CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE DEFENDANT 
BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY WAS NOT PREJU-
DICIAL. 
Appellant contends that the trial court committed preju-
dicial error in allowing the District Attorney over objection 
to question the defendant about various crimes for which he 
had neither been accused nor convicted. This objection harks 
to the very nature of the admissibility of all evidence. In State 
v. Scott et al., 111 Utah 9, ( 175 P2d 1016) at page 20, the 
court states: 
The basic rule of admissibility of evidence is that 
all evidence having probative value - that is, that 
tends to prove an issue, is admissible. 
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The second axiom on which our law of Evidence 
rests is this: All facts having rational probative value 
are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids. 
Certainly, a criminal act may be a fact, relevant to, and pro-
bative of an issue. 
In addition one should remember a second fundamental 
idea as expressed by Wigmore Volume 1, Section 13, page 299: 
It constantly happens that a fact which is inadmis-
sible for one purpose is admissible for, other purposes 
* * * 
And, as clarified on page 300: 
In other words, when an evidentiary fact is offered 
for one purpose, and bceomes admissible by satisfying 
all the rules applicable to it in that capacity, it is not 
inadmissible because it does not satisfy the rules ap-
plicable to it in some other capacity and because the 
jury might improperly consider it in the latter capacity. 
The appellant asserts "that the commission of the of-
fense for which a person is on trial cannot be proved by evidence 
that such person committed another but independent offense." 
Certainly there is no dispute with this proposition if it means 
that the prior offenses are inadmissible as evidence for the 
purpose of showing a disposition to commit offenses, and 
thence the commission of a particular wrong. Wharton's Crimi-
nal Evidence, Edition 11, Volume 1, Section 262 at page 322, 
states: 
* * * other offenses are inadmissible when offered 
for the purpose of proving the crime charged, or to 
show that the defendant would be likely to commit the 
crime with which he is charged. * * * 
11 
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But it is fundamentally in error to assert, as many have 
done, that if a party is charged with a specific crime, no evi-
dence of the commission by him , of another crime or wrong 
is receivable against him. As Wharton, supra, states in the 
completion of the above quoted paragraph: 
* * * the evidence of other crimes is admissible to 
show motive, and, where relevant for this purpose, 
the admissibility is not affected by th fact that such 
evidence may prove other crimes. (Emphasis added). 
See also Wigmore on Evidence, Volume 1, Section 217. 
Wharton, Section 345, page 490, sets forth the general rule: 
In certain classes of cases collateral offenses may 
be shown to prove the mental processes or mental at-
titude of the accused. This includes five different things: 
( 1) Motive * * * ( 2) intent * * * ( 3) absence of 
accident or mistake * * * ( 4) identity * * * ( 5) a 
common scheme or plan * * * 
State v. Scott, supra, adopts rule 311 of the Model Code 
of evidence which states: 
Subject to Rule 306 [rule as to character evidence], 
evidence that a person committed a crime or civil 
wrong on a specified occasion is inadmissible as tending 
to prove that he committed a crime or civil wrong on 
another occasion if, but only if, the evidence is relevant 
solely as tending to prove his disposition to commit 
such a crime or civil wrong or to commit crimes or civil 
wrongs generally. 
Therein, the court tracing the history of the rule (viewing 
it as a narrow exception to a broad rule of admissibility or as 
an exception to a broad rule of exclusion) states: 
12 
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* * * Exceptions which are mentioned in the cited 
cases are: if the evidence tends to show intent or 
motive, if it indicates the offense was not due to acci-
dent or mistake, * * * (Emphasis added). 
See also the comment in the Model Code of Evidence, page 196: 
* * * nothing is more common than to find the 
unqualified asertion that if a party is charged with 
having committed a specified crime or civil wrong, no 
evidence of the commission by him of another crime 
or wrong is receivable against him. This is true where 
the series of inferences on which the relevance of 
the evidence depends is from the commission of the 
other wrong to a disposition to commit such a wrong 
or to commit crimes or torts generally, thence to the 
commission of the particular wrong. The cases are 
legion, however, which admit such evidence when of-
fered to prove motive, intent, preparation, plan or 
identity. (Emphasis added.) 
In State v. DeWeese, 51 Utah 515, 172 P 290, an interest-
ing and bizarre murder case, an autobiography of the accused, 
listing prior crimes of which he had never been accused or 
convicted, was introduced and received in evidence. Defendant 
objected generally and the specific objection was that "proof 
of the other crimes not tending to prove the crime for which 
he was being tried only tended to prejudice him in the tninds 
of the jury." The paper was admitted and upon defendant's 
motion, the judge charged the jury "that they were permitted 
to consider the burglaries solely upon the question of motive." 
Therein there was a thorough discussion of the authorities 
and the court stated in 51 Utah, page 53 3: 
* * * None of the authorities referred to dispute 
the proposition that proof of other crimes, whether 
I S 
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similar or dissimilar, connected or unconnected, may 
be admitted to prove a motive for the specific crime 
for which the defendant is being tried. (Emphasis 
added). 
The court on page 53 5 recognizes the danger of such evidence 
and states: 
* * * We admit the danger of permitting evidence 
of other crimes than the one specifically charged against 
the defendant, and that such evidence should be ad-
mitted with great caution and circumspection, for the 
tendency to prejudice a defendant in such cases is 
admittedly great; but when the evidence is relevant, 
as in this case, to prove motive, as we think we have 
shown, then it is admissible by all of the authorities 
with which we are familiar. (Emphasis added). 
The above quoted authorities sustain the proposition that 
evidence of prior criminal acts of which one has never been 
charged or convicted may be admissible in evidence for the 
limited purpose of showing motive. See also State v. Bowen, 
43 Utah 111 at 114; State v. Kappas et al., 100 Utah 274, 114 
P2d 205; State v. Prettyman, 113 Utah 36, 191 P2d 142; and 
State v. Morgan, 22 Utah 162, as having some bearing. 60 
C.J.S. at page 86, in a discussion of motive, states: 
* * * Motive has to do wholly with desire, and prob-
ably a motive does not operate to influence positive 
action unless there are facts in existence which create 
the motive. 
Wigmore, Volume II, Section 390, page 331 and following, 
states: 
The circumstances which might excite a desire to 
kill are innumerable. * * * Among the instances most 
14 
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commonly offered for ajudication, the following may 
be noted: 
* * * The expediency of preventing the discovery 
of a former crime, or of evading an arrest or a prose-
cution for it, may lead to the desire to kill. 
It is commonplace that the existence of a fact may be 
proved in one of two ways or both; ( 1) through extrinsic rec-
ords or testimony or ( 2) by eliciting from the mouth of the 
accused on cross-examination the existence of certain facts. 
A close perusal of the cross-examination by the district at-
torney shows an effort, not to make out accused as an habitual 
criminal as appellant would have you believe, but to get from 
the accused himself testimony as to his own past actions, his 
own knowledge, his own state of mind. In short, the district 
attorney sought to establish certain facts, from which one 
may reasonably infer, the motive for murder-the desire to 
escape. The whole line of cross examination was designed to 
show motive, and was in fact successful in establishing certain 
important facts from which motive could be inferred. 
Q. Well, you knew that they wanted you for stealing 
payroll checks from the Alamo Cleaners in Cali-
fornia, didn't you? 
A. Yes (R. 290). 
Q. And you said that you had stolen some Alamo 
Cleaners checks? (R. 294). 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You knew also, did you, at the time that you were 
leaving, that there would be not only that, (refer-
ring to parole violation) but there would be forty-
seven counts of forgery if they saw fit to press them, 
didn't you? (R. 299). 
15 
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A. Yes, it's one to fourteen (R. 300). 
Q. What's that? 
A. Term is one to fourteen on that. 
Q. For one count of forgery? 
A. Yes, and they usually run them c.c. since my resti-
tution. It's not enough to do this thing about. 
Q. Well, in other words, there would have been an-
other fourteen years at least? 
A. One to fourteen, yes, sir. 
Q. And you were very anxious to keep away from any 
law enforcement officers, weren't you, when you 
were ging to Reno ? 
A. Well, that's natural, yes, sir. 
Questions were put concerning parole violations, tying in with 
the questions concerning the stealing and forging of checks. 
Q. And you knew that that was a violation of your 
parole, didn't you? -
A. Yes, sir, but not a serious violation (R. 290). 
Q. I think last night, Mr. Neal, that you said that you 
didn't know that you had violated your parole. Is 
that right? (R. 294). 
A. No, sir. 
After having him admit that the forgeries were parole 
violations (R. 294), defendant admitted (R. 295) he knew his 
parole board would be considering his forgeries as a parole 
violation. 
Q. The possession by you of a gun would have vio-
lated your parole, wouldn't it? (R. 298) . 
A. Yes, sir. 
16 
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Q. And you bought the gun and kept it, didn't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The defendant indicated he knew that he would have four 
years to serve for parole violation (R. 299). 
Q. Now, when you parked the car here on Tuesday 
night, you figured that the car would be hot, didn't 
you? (R. 302). 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, of course, you were very anxious to escape, 
weren't you, this officer when he got you? (R. 289). 
A. Anybody would be-
The three questions objected to by appellant were merely 
additional efforts to elicit from the mouth of the accused facts 
which one could add to the other evidence of motive. The dis-
trict attorney was successful in eliciting the fact of the Alamo 
robbery and the perpetration of certain forgeries. Also, the 
parole violations. These were established by the admissions 
of the accused without specific objection by appellant's attorney. 
The district attorney was unsuccessful in gaining admissions 
concerning certain other robberies. The mere fact that the 
district attorney failed to put in evidence to contradict the nega-
tive answers of defendant and in addition to add to the ad-
mitted facts from which we can reasonably infer a motive for 
murder was not prejudicial. The court, further, tempered the 
effect of such evidence by giving a limiting instruction in In-
struction 7 which states: 
There has also been received evidence tending to 
show that the defendant has committed other felonies 
17 
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for which he has not been convicted. This evidence may 
be considered by you only in connection with whether 
or not the defendant had a motive to kill Owen T. 
Farley (R. 21). 
The cross examination of the district attorney when so 
safeguarded, was not prejudicial. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING SEN-
TENCE ON DEFENDANT IN ABSENCE OF DEFEND-
ANT'S COUNSEL. 
Point VIII of appellant's brief states that "the court 
erred in imposing sentence on the defendant in the absence 
of defendant's counsel." To sustain such a contention, the 
appellant relies on the constitution, a statute, and one case, 
all of which assert a fundamental legal proposition that in 
original prosecutions the accused may "appear and defend in 
person and by counsel." While the authorities quoted, without 
dispute, sustain the proposition asserted, a more pointed inquiry 
and the real issue in question, is whether the presence of counsel 
at the time of the imposition of sentence is included within 
that fundamental right. 
On that point, there is some division of opinion. The cases 
go three ways. Group one goes off on the idea that an accused 
is entitled to assistance of counsel at "trial" that the "impo-
sition of sentence" is after the trial and that counsel is not 
required at that time. State v. Hughes, 170 La. 1063, 129 
So. 63 7 states·: "It is not essential to the validity of a sentence 
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that the attorney for the defendant shall be present when 
sentence is pronounced; for the sentence is not part of the 
proceedings which constitute trial according to articles 332, 
333 and 334 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." (A statute 
very similar to Utah statute, 105-32-1 Utah Code Annotated 
1943, designating the order of trial.) See also Ex Parte Oliver, 
____ Texas ----· 240 S. W. 2d 316, a 1951 Texas case with pe-
culiar facts where sentence is not pronounced until the con-
viction has been determined on appeal, and the pronouncement 
of sentence is not considered to be part of the trial. 
Group two is made up generally of a number of federal 
cases which indicate that the right to counsel extends to all 
stages of the original proceedings. Thomas v. Hunter, 153 
F2d 834, states: 
To hold that the return of the verdict into court 
and sentence thereafter is not part of the trial is to 
accord the term "trial" a very narrow and technical 
definition-too narrow a definition when the question 
under consideration is the violation of human rights 
and liberty guaranteed by the constitution. 
See also Wilfong v. Johnston, C.C.A. 9th, 156 F2d 507; 
Martin v. U. S., 182 F2d 225; People v. Fields, 198 P2d 104; 
and the basic statement in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 
that an accused has a right to the guiding hand of counsel at 
every stage of the proceedings. Also Coates v. Lawrence, 46 
F. Supp. 414, 416, that "a person accused of crime is entitled 
to assistance of counsel at all stages of trial including sentence." 
On the very point in issue, the federal cases point up 
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sentence is to be imposed. In Martin v. U. S., 182 F2d 225 
(at 227), the court says: 
The very nature of the proceeding at the time of 
imposition of sentence makes the presence of defend-
ant's counsel at that time necessary if the constitutional 
requirement is to be met. There is then a real need 
for counsel. The advisibility of an appeal must then, 
or shortly, be determined. Then is the opportunity af-
forded for presentation to the courts of facts in extenu-
ation of the offense, or in explanation of defendant's 
conduct; to correct any errors or mistakes in reports 
of defendant's past record; and, in short to appeal to 
the equity of the court in its administration and en-
forcement of penal laws. Any judge with trial experi-
ence must acknowledge that such disclosures frequently 
result in mitigation, or even suspension of penalty. 
• (Emphasis added.) 
In Batson v. U. S., 137 F2d 288, as a matter of dictum, the 
court states: 
* * * VIe believe that an accused should have the 
opportunity to be heard by counsel on the sentence to 
be imposed, and that a court should not impose sentence 
in the absence of counsel without expressly ascertain-
ing that defendant does not desire his presence. Many 
considerations influence the length of a sentence which 
is to be imposed, and a defendant should have the op-
portunity to have his attorney present any mitigating 
circumstances to the court for its consideration in de-
termining the weight of the sentence. (Emphasis add-
ed). 
The third group of cases comprises a hybrid group where 
the absence of counsel was not considered prejudicial. Com-
monwealth v. Polens, 327 Pa. 544, 194 A. 652; Kent v. San-
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ford, Warden 121 F2d 216; Lovvorn v. Johnston, 118 F2d 
704; McGuire v. Hunter, Warden 138 F2d 379; Moore v. 
Aderhold, Warden 108 F2d 729. 
Assuming that normally the better road for the law to 
take in this state is to insist on the presence of counsel at the 
time of sentence imposition, the state submits the following: 
( 1) The absence of counsel in this particular case in no way 
prejudiced the defendant. ( 2) Even if counsel's absence be 
. deemed prejudicial, then the case should be remanded . only 
for the purpose of resentencing defendant. 
In support of contention number one, we refer to 103-
28-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which states: 
Penalty for Murder 
Every person guilty of murder in the first degree 
shall suffer death, or, upon the recommendation of the 
jury, may be imprisoned at hard labor in the state prison 
for life, in the discretion of the court. * * * (Emphasis 
added.) 
State v. Romeo, 42 Utah 46, 128 P 530, states in essence that 
upon the conviction of murder in the first degree this section 
gives the jury the discretion to recommend the defendant to 
life imprisonment. In the absence of such a recommendation, 
the court upon such a conviction is required to impose the 
death penalty. 
This demonstrates the complete lack of discretion on the 
part of the judge in this case. He could only pronounce death. 
He could not in any way modify the statutorily described 
penalty. This factor distinguishes this case from the many 
federal pronouncements which indicate that counsel should 
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have an opportunity to be heard on the sentence, in order to 
introduce mitigating circumstances for the purpose of influenc-
ing the discretion of the judge. The judge here can go in but one 
direction regardless of statement of counsel. 
At the return of the verdict, the attorney may pursue two 
possible courses of action. 105-39-3;, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, alows a motion for a new trial. 105-35-1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, provides for a motion in arrest of judgment. 
No motion in arrest of judgment was filed. Motion for a new 
trial was filed (R. 338-39), was denied outside presence of 
counsel (R. 340), and on the filing of a subsequent motion 
for rehearing was heard and denied (R. 346), thereby curing 
any defect, if there be any, in not having an opportunity for 
oral argument on the original motion for new trial. 
Though the action in imposing sentence sans counsel 
may have been technically in error, under the circumstance of 
this case, neither the "guiding hand of counsel" nor the skilled 
advocacy of mitigating circumstances could have· produced 
a different result. The judge had an affirmative statutorily 
imposed duty. He could do only that which he has aready 
done. Defendant has in nowise been prejudiced. 
If the court was technically in error, the case should be 
remanded only for the purpose of resentencing defendant. 
See Wilfong v. Johnston, 156 F2d 507 at 510. See also In Re 
Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 14 S. Ct. 323, 38 L. Ed. 149. 
POINT V 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
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DENY A l\IOTION FOR THE EXAJ\HNA TION OF DES-
IGN A TED PHYSICAL EVIDENCE NOR A MOTION FOR 
A REHEARING OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Point VI of appellant's brief charges error in denying 
( 1) motion for rehearing on motion for new trial and ( 2) 
motion for an order requiring examination of designated 
physical evidence (R. 346). The foundation of both motions 
as indicated in appellant's brief was "newly discovered evi-
dence." 
The law concerning newly discovered evidence is well 
stated in the case of State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P2d 
167. At page 559, the court states: 
Newly discovered evidence, to be ground for a new 
trial, must satisfy several elementary requirements. 
The courts are not in accord respecting all these re-
quirements, but fairly agree that the newly discovered 
evidence be such as could not with reasonable dili-
gence have been discovered and produced at the trial, 
that it be not merely cumulative, that that it be such 
as to render a different result probable on the retrial 
of the case. Note, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 903'. 
And at page 561: 
* * * It is the general rule that the granting or re-
fusing of a motion for a new trial rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and that an appellate 
court will not disturb its action unless it appears that 
this discretion has been abused to the prejudice of the 
defendant. 16 C. J. 1119; 20 R. C. L. 290; People v. 
Sullivan, 3 Cal. App. 502, 86 P. 834. It was the duty 
of the trial judge to give careful attention to the affi-
davit filed in support of the motion and to consider 
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it in connection with the evidence given at the trial. 
Having had the defendant and the witnesses before him, 
he was in a better position than we are to judge of 
the probable effect of the testimony now proposed. To 
justify him in granting a new trial he should be satis-
fied that the proffered evidence is such as to render 
a different result probable on a retrial of the case. 
Note, 46 L.R.A. (N. S.) 903; Perry v. People, 38 
Colo. 23, 87 P. 796. Or he might have granted it 
had he any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the 
defendant. People v. Markle, 89 Cal. 82, 26 P. 642. 
Before we are authorized to reverse the action of the 
trial court and direct the granting of a new trial, it 
must appear that the evidence proposed is of such 
character, when viewed with the other evidence given on 
the trial, as to raise a reasonable presumption that the 
result of a second trial would be different from that 
in the first and that the trial court had abused its dis-
cretion or was manifestly wrong in overruling the 
motion. State v. Montgomery, 37 Utah 515, 109 P. 815 
State v. Montgomery, 3 7 Utah 515, at 520 states: 
* * * In no event, * * * is this so-called newly 
discovered evidence "so conclusive in its character as 
to raise a reasonable presumption that the result of 
a second trial would be different from the first," which 
would have to be the case in order to authorize us to 
grant a new trial. 
In considering the motion for the examination of desig-
nated physical evidence, we must note that it is one step re-
moved from the normal concept of newly discovered evidence 
-in fact it deals not with newly discovered evidence but with 
evidence yet to be discovered and which, in fact, ascertained, 
may have no material relationship with the issue in question 
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and which may not, in all probability, raise a presumption 
of a different probable result. The state submits that by the 
exercise of due diligence, counsel could have discovered the 
sought for evidence prior to trial or during trial by a timely 
motion for a continuance. See El Paso Southwestern R. Co. 
v. Barrett, 101 S. W. 1025, 1029; 46 Tex. Civ. App. 14. In 
the application of the law to the circumstances, we must con-
clude that the motion's denial was not in error. 
In relation to the motion for a new trial on the basis of 
Officer Jackson's affidavit (R. 345) evidencing the fact of 
a search of Don Neal's car prior to his arrest and the then 
disclosure of no secreted weapon, the state submits that due 
diligence on the part of counsel would have produced such 
evidentiary fact prior to or during trial. Conceding for pur-
poses of argument that due diligence could not have produced 
the desired evidence, it is submitted that that evidence when 
considered in relation with all of the other evidence, is not 
of such a character as to raise a reasonable presumption that 
the result of the second trial would be different from that of 
the first. If such be true, then the conclusion, of course, fol-
lows that the trial court was not in error in exercising its broad 
discretion by denying such motion for a re-hearing of the 
denial of a motion for a new trial. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING OF-
FICER CLARK OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
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DEMONSTRATE THE MOVABILITY OF HIS HANDS 
WHICH WERE HANDCUFFED BEHIND HIS BACK. 
Appellant's Point III relates to a certain demonstration 
performed before the jury and detailed on page 238-239 of 
the record. Over the general objection of appellant as to its 
competency, relevancy and materiality (R. 238) the Court 
allowed Officer Harold Clark to sit on an armless chair, hands 
handcuffed behind his back, and demonstrate the ability of 
a person so situated to move his hands and point a gun. After 
the demonstration and after the jury had observed the ability 
of one so seated and cuffed to move his hands and point a 
gun, the appellant then interposed a specific objection claiming 
dissimilarity of conditions between the conditions of the demon-
stration and the conditions when Officer Farley was shot. 
As a preliminary observation it should be borne in mind 
that it is elementary in the law that objections should be timely 
put and except where proffered evidence is inadmissible for 
any purpose, the basis of the objection must be stated with 
particularity. See Snowden v. Pleasant Valley Coal Company, 
16 Utah 366 and 52 Pac. 599 and Culmer v. Clift, 14 Utah 
286. 
It is submitted that the objection when first made was 
without sufficient particularity to justify the trial court in 
excluding the evidence. Likewise, the specific objection made 
after the demonstration was not timely put. 
Bypassing the argument concerning the timeliness of ob-
jections and turning to the substance of the matter we find 
that the law relating to experiments is well summarized in 
8 A.L.R. 18 and 85 A.L.R. 479. There the cases are collected 
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which pertain to experimental evidence as affected by similarity 
-or dissimilarity of conditions. From the cases therein cited one 
is struck by four fundamental ideas which state the law. 
( 1) The conditions present at the demonstration or experi-
ment must be substantially similar to the conditions existing 
at the time of the occurrence. ( 2) The limit of permissible 
dissimilarity is drawn where such variation is likely to con-
fuse or mislead the jury. (3) The admission of experimental 
evidence is peculiarily within the discretion of the trial judge 
and will not be interferred with in the absence of abuse. ( 4) 
Given essential conditions substantially similar, then any de-
parture of minor variation goes to the weight rather than the 
admissibility of the evidence. 
A close reading of the record reveals that the demonstra-
tion performed by Officer Clark in no wise purported to be 
a complete re-enactment, pantomime, or demonstration of 
the crime~ It did show that a person sitting down, hands cuffed 
behind his back, is not incapable of so moving his hands and 
body as to be in a position from which he could shoot a 
person. It is submitted that for this purpose that the condi-
tions present at the demonstration were substantially similar 
to the conditions existent at the time of the occurrence; that 
what dissimilarity existed did not in any way confuse or mis-
lead the jury; that the evidence was properly admitted in the 
sound discretion of the court, and the existing variations were 
taken into consideration by the jury in its evaluation of the 
weight to be given to the demonstration. 
POINT VII 
THE DEFENDANT WAS AFFORDED A FAIR TRIAL. 
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Analysis of the record reveals that the defendant was 
afforded a fair and impartial trial. He was represented by able 
and experienced counsel. He had opportunity to present wit-
nesses and confront and cross examine those witnesses pre-
senetd against him. The newspape~ incident referred to in ap-
pellant's brief when considered with all the other facts and 
circumstances of the case in no way affected the essential 
fairness and impartiality of defendant's trial and was ac-
quiesced in by defendant's counsel. The burden of showing 
any essential unfairness in connection with the trial has not 
been met and it is respectfully submitted that the proceedings 
by which the defendant was convicted of the crime of first 
degree murder 'are free from prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the entire proceedings and the law in relation 
thereto shows that the defendant, Don Jesse Neal, was afforded 
a fair trial in accordance with established legal principles and 
that the proceedings were free from prejudcial error. It is 
respectfully submitted therefore that the verdict of the jury 
and the judgment and sentence of the court should be affirmed 
by this Honorable Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
BRUCE S. JENKINS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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